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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 19.03.1997 
COM(97) l32 final 
971 Oll3 (ACC) 
Proposal for a 
COUNCll.. REGULATION <EC> 
on aid (o certain shipyards under restructuring 
and amending Council Regulation 3094/95 
(presented by the Commission) ...... -.:.... 
Introduction 
As stated in Council Regulation (EC) No.  1904/96 the relevant rules of  the Seventh Cowl.<:ij 
Directive on aid to sbipbui1ding (90/684/EEC, further ea1led "the  Directive") remain applica.ble 
pending the entry into force of the OBCD  Sbipbui1cling  Agreemerlt and  until  31  December 
1997 at the latest.  · 
Under the Directive operating aid granted to shipyards, including contract-related production 
aid (whether direct or indirect)is .subject to a CODIOIOJl maximum lid  eciJigg.-The QAly opmti.D& 
aid  exempted  from  this  ceiling  are  credit  tacllities  complying  with  the  1981  OECP 
Understanding  on  Export Credits  for  Sbips  (Article 4.6)  and  aid  granted  as developnent 
assistance to developing countries (Article 4.7).  · 
As regards investment aids the Directive reqllir.es that these UW$t be ·linked to a restnlCI".Wipg 
plan whicll does not involve any increase in the yard's .~.capacity  or which nwst be 
directly linked  to a correspondins  irreversible  reduction  incapacity  of other yards  in  the 
Member  State .concerned.  The prime yon<lit.ion for  closure aid is that the resulting capacity 
reduction is of  a  genuine and irreversible nature. 
Apart from  these  general  rules  the  Directive  provided  also for  a llUII1ber  of time- li.mited 
derogations for eertain ~  states which are now expired. However, in a nurilber of  cases 
the targets of  the underlying resttu<:turing programmes could not be achieved in the expected 
time frame or new developments on the markets require further measures. It  is for this reason 
that a number ofMember States hJve notified the COJ1llllission of  fl!.ans to grant aid in S\lpport 
of necessary further ~  of a number of shipyards.  The  aid  pr<>g1111DU1eS  include 
various  measures that are not  compatible  wnh  the  exislini ~  ·  rules.  They co\lld. 
therefore only be approved by the Commission if  the Couneil were to adopt an amendment of 
the Regulation which would in essence update previous derogations. 
The background and the tecbnical detail$ of  the cases concerned are described in ~  I 
(Germany), 2 (Greece) and3 (Spain) of  this dOcument.  · 
-
.  Accordingly and in the  li~  of  ,the information provided in the annexes  1 to .3  it is propos«! 
that the Council. adopts, after COII$Ultation of  the European Par~  and the EcollOmic and 
Social  Committee,  the ·attached  "Council  R~tion on  aid  t()  .certain  shipyar<ls  under 
restructuring and amending Council Regulatioi13094/95. Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on aid to certain shipyards under restructuring 
and amending Council Regulation 3094/95 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 92(3)(e) 
and 113 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinioli of  the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee, 
Whereas by virtue of Council Regulation (EC) No.  3094/95
1
,  as last amended by Council Regulati  n 
(EC) No.  1904/96
2 the provisions of Council Directive  90/684/EE~. amended by Council  Directi  e 
92/68/EEC are applicable to aid to shipbuilding until either the OECD "Agreement respecting no 
competitive conditions in the commercial shipbuilding and repair industry'.senters into force,  or at  e 
latest unti131 December 1997, 
Whereas the shipbuilding industry is important for the mitigation of  structural problems in a number  f 
regions of  the Community, 
Whereas the direct application of  the common maximum ceiling does not allow for t{l.e comprehensive 
restructuring measures necessary in a number of  shipylmls in these regions and a special transitional 
arrangement should therefore be introduced, · 
Whereas  it was  acknowledged  in  Council  Directive  92/68/EEC that the  shipbuilding industry  in  e 
territories of  the former German Democratic Republic required urgent and comprehensive restru.ctwml!r 
in order to become competitive, a target which  has not been fully achieved for two  shipyards  in  e 
envisaged restructuring period due to 11nforeseeable circumstances beyond control of  these shipyards, 
Whereas in the easel of the two shiyards located in the former German Democratic Republic a furth  r 
transitional arrangement is needed, in order to enable a completion of their restructurings, which sh  I 
allow them to comply subsequently with the aid rules  applic~ble to the Community as a whole, 
1 OJ L332/1 of  30 December 1995 
2 OJ L 25115 of 3 October 1996 
3 OJ L 380127 of 31 December 1990 
4 OJ L 219/54 of  4 August 1992 
5 COM (94) 460 final, of 3 November 1994 _1_._!_ __  -
Whereas the shipbuilding capacity in the territories of the fanner German Democ;ratic Republic was 
reduced  to  327  000  cgt  by  31  December  1995  and  whereas  the  German  Government  made .the 
commitment to ensure that this capacity limitation is fully re$pected at least until end of  the year 2000, 
and to extend this limitation until end of 2005 unless the Commission authorizes an earlier tennination 
of  the capacity limitations;. 
Whereas a further reduction of shipbuilding capacity in Germany will arrive fro!JI the closure of the 
Bremer Vulkan Werft in Bremen-Vegesack: fornewbuildiog before end of 1997, 
Whereas;  in spite of the  efforts  made by the Greek GoVernment to privatise all  its  public  yards  by 
March 1993, the Hellenic shipyard was only sold in September 1995,  to a co-operative of its workers, 
the State having kept a majority holding of  51% for defenee interests; 
Whereas for the financial viability of  the restructuring of Hellenic shipyard necessitates the provision of 
aid which allows the company to Write off  the debts accumulated before its ddayed privatization; 
.. 
Whereas a further restructuring of  the publicly owned yards in Spain is necessary so that each ofthese 
yards, being established as individual profit centers at full cost basis, will achieve financial viability by 
31 December 1998, 
Whereas under this restructuring plan there will be a capacity reduction in these yards from 240;ooo 
cgrt to 210,000 cgrt, complemented by the non-reopening to shipbuilding of  the public yard at Astano · 
(135,000 cgrt capacity) and by additional capacity reductions elsewhere in Spain amounting to a further 
17,500 cgrt, 
Whereas no further aid for restructuring purposes (including loss compensations, loss guarantees and 
rescue aid) will be made available to the shipyards covered by this Regulation, 
2 HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION 
Article 1 
--
1.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Council Regulation No.  3094/95,  for  the yards  und 
restructuring  specified  in  paragraphs  (2)  ,  (3)  and  (4)  the  Commission  may  declar 
additional operating aid  compatible fur the specific purposes and up to the amounts ther 
specified. 
2.  In the Territory of the former German Democratic Republic,  operating aid for the perio 
from  01  March  1996  until  31. December  1998  in  favour  of MTW-Schiffswerft  an 
Volkswerft Stralsund may be considered compatible-with the common market up to a tot 
amount of 333 mio DM and 395 mio DM respectively. The said amounts comprise the ai 
to facilitate  the  further· operation of the yards,  social  aid,  contract-related aid  under th 
'  "Wettbewerbshilfe"  scheme  and  the  aid  equivalent  of guarantees.  For  these  yards  th 
provisions  of Chapter  II  of  Directive  90/684/EEC  shall  not  be  applicable  during  th 
restructuring  period with  the  exception of Article  4  paragraphs  6  and  7,  and  no  othe 
operating aid  may be  paid for. works on contracts or losses  in  the  relevant  period.  Fo 
contracts signed during the restructuring period but carried out after it, the community rule 
on contract-related aid as valid on the day of  contract signature shall apply. 
3.  Aid in the the 'form of  a waiver-of debts of"Hellenic shipyards", up to the amount ofGD 
54.525 billion,  corresponding to debts related to civil work of the yard, as existing on 3 
December 1991  and accrued by interest rates and penalties until  31  January 1996 may b 
regarded as compatible with tile Treaty.  Apart from  Article  5,  all  provisions  of  ectiv 
90/684/EEC shall apply to this yard. 
4.  Aid  for  the  restructuring  of the  publicly-owned  yards  in  Spain  may  be  considere 
compatible with the common market up to an  amount  of 135.028  billion  pesetas in  th 
following forms: 
•  Interest payments of up to 62.028 billion  pesetas in  1988-1994 on loans  taken on t 
cover unpaid  previously approved aid 
•  Tax credits in the period 1995-1999 of  up to 58 billion pesetas 
•  Capital injection in 1997 of  up to ·15 billion pesetas 
All other provisions of directive 90/684/EEC shalt apply to these yards. ___ .J.  .  .I,__._  ~ 
Articlel 
For the  resiructuring  programmes  benefitting  from  aid  as  provided  for  iri.cArticle  1,  the 
.. 
notification  shall be complemented by a programme · for the monitoring c:if the actual use of 
the investment and operating aid,. compliance with the restructuring plan and enrorcement of 
capacity limitations which is acceptable to the Commission. 
Artide3 
·  This Regulation shall enter into farce on the day following that of  its publication in the Official 
Journal of  the European CollllllUIIities. 
It shall apply until31 December 19.98. 
.  .  . 
Th;s Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States  .. 
4 ANNEX! 
Derogation for Germany to grant aid towards the completion of the 
restructuring of two east German shipyards 
L  Background 
1.  On  20  July  1992  the  Council  adopted  Directive  92/68/EEC  amending  Directive 
90/684/EEC (Seventh Directive on aid  to shipbuilding) by the addition of Article  lO(a), 
which provided for a derogation for the shipyards on the territory of the fonner German 
Democratic Republic. The new Article lO(a) allowed the shipyards in the new Under to be 
exempted from the provisions applying to Community shipyards so as  to allow them to 
carry out an urgent and comprehensive restructuring to become competitive. In parallel the 
German Government had to make sure that a genuine and irreversible reduction of  40% of 
shipbuilding capacity is carried out by 31  December 1995. Consequently as from  1996 the 
shipbuilding capacity in the said territory is limited to 327.000 cgt. 
2.  At the time, there were still seven shipyards active in the said region, of  which one, Neptun 
Werft in Rostock) had been already closed for newbuildings and operates now as a repair 
and  conversion yard with  an  annual  capacity  limitation  of 300  000  hla.  Another  yard, 
RoBlauer  Schiffswerft was  closed  in  the meantime.  Consequently,  five  shipyards  remain 
active in the newbuilding of seagoing vessels in the region.  In order to comply with the 
requirement set out in Article lO{a) of a 40% capacity reduction, the German Government 
allocated a specific capacity limitation to each of  the yards which entered into force on 31 
December 1995. The capacity limits of  the various yards are as follows: 
Table 1: Shipbuilding capacity in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
3.  The restructurings  of Elbewerft Boizenburg,  Kvaerner  Warnow Werft  and  Peene-W 
were completed as envisaged in  1995.  These  shipyards  operate now under the cmnmonJ 
Community rules.  The two others,  MTW-Schiffswerft (MTW) and  Volkswerft  Str:alstmdl 
(VW~)  had. been acquired by Bremer Vulkan Verbund (BVV). Their restructurings started! 
with  ~orne delay:  In the case of MTW, it was temporarily planned to move the yard to 
new jocation. This was given up in spring  1994 and the actual restructuring began only 
autumn 1994. VWS was privatised only in 1993, therefore the first restructuring u..,,.,.u'"''"l 
started only atthe end of  that year. The two yards were therefore right in the middle of 
major  construction works when BVV entered into  severe financial  difficulties  in  auturnnJ 
1995, which progressed to a failed debt composition procedure in February 1996, and a 
bankruptcy in May 1996. 
4.  Following their privatisation both yards received for their restructurings state aid which 
authorized by the Commission in tranches. A total of 597.2 mio  DM in operating aid 
authorized forMTW under aid N 692/B/91 of20 December 1992 and aid N 692/1191  of 1 May 1994. At total of 288.8 mio.D~  of the planned)82.2 mio DM in investment aid and 
.18.0 mio;  DM in closure aid were authorized on 20 December 1992 (N 692/B/91} and 20 
September 1995 (N 572/95). In the ·case of  VWS, an amount of  680.5. mio DM in operating 
aid was authorized on 21 December 1993 under aid N 692/F/91. A total of  309.6 mio. :OM 
of  the planned 398. Tinvestment aid and  1U  of  the 8,5 .mio. DM closure aid were authorized 
on 21  December 1993 (N 692/F/91)..~1 JUne-1995 (N 84/95) and 14 November 1995 (N 
~~J- ..  .  ' 
. Accorc!ing  to  the provisionS  of At'ticle  10(a)  of the  Directive  and  the  Commission's 
decisions. to authorize the aid,. the aid J)llymentS had to be strictly limited to the activities of 
. these yards. Reports of  independent auditors were required to ensure that this "spill-over'' 
prohibition  was  fully  respected.  As  descnbed .  in  full  detiin. in the  "Cc:~mniisslon nc:itice 
purstianf.to Article 93(2).of.theEC Treaty to other Member States and interested parties' on 
the spill-ovelcofresttuctudng aid fur MTW-Schiffswerft and Volkswerft tci other Bremer . 
Vulkait ·  V  erbund AG undertakings"1 a substantial  part of the aid •  was,  however,  misused. 
· According to the report of  .n auditing firm epgaged by the (Jerman priv~on  agency 
BvS fur an investigation on the origin and the fate ofthe funds of  the t\'{o yards, which had 
been placed in the central ca.sh ritanagement system of the BW group, the situation is as 
following (all amounts in mio DM): 
Table 2.:  Spill-over of  reitructuring aid form MTW and VWS (ltll am.ounts in mio DM) 
'  .·  ..  MTW  Volkswerft 
Total outstanding placed in  577,2 
.  268.9 
the cash-concentration (per  · 
21.2.1996)  .. 
' 
. 
of  which:  ..  .  . 
Investment aid  55.3 
.  36:8 
operating aid  ·  268.1 
..  60.7 
closure aid ·  I  ..  .1.5  0.0 
subtotal authorised aid  324.9  97,5 
unauthorised aid  120.8'  . 
.  76.7' 
.·  'accrued interest and non  Bl.7  . 94.7 
aid related tranSfers 
.  . 
5. Hence, the two yards had placed M6. 1 mio DM in the cash concentration system at the time 
when .BW had  to apply  for  a debt  composition  procedure.  Participation in  the  cash 
concentration system· had been imposed  by BVV  on the yards.  the management. of the 
shipyards  had virtually no  illtluence  on these  placements.  Claims  ti;lr  a recovery' of  .the 
money have \teen filed under the' bankiuptcy procedure.. In addition, members of  the former 
management ofBVV are sued under criminal and civil law, and parliamentary investigations 
have been launched to obtain a full clarification about these maSsive financial irregularities.· 
The Commission has extended the current investigation procedure in otder to futd out if  a 
decision  should be taken on a recovery  of part of the  misused 'funds from  the effective 
beneficiaries, either daughter compames or firms linked otherwise to the BW  group! 
1 OJ No. C 150of24 May 1996, forextensionofprocedureeompareOJNo.C 65 of! March 1997. 
2 includes investment loan of 112.4 mioDMwhich was foreseen under original aid ~butdisbutoed  without 
approval from thtl-Commission. 
3 includes 70.4 mio DM investment aid foreseen Qncler the original !lid prognmme but dMnused on a.loan basis prior; to . · 
the autlwrisation of  the Commission  •  ·  · 
4  '  .  ' 
. For reference compare footnote 1 
2 n. The development ofMTW-SchitTswerft and Volkswerft Stralsund since February 
1996 
· 6.  When the Bremer Vulkan group collapsed end of  February 1996 the two yards were left  n 
the middle  of the  restructuring with hardly  any  liquidity.  For technical  and  commerc· 
reasons  neither the  large  scale  construction  works  nor construction -of  ships  could  e 
stopped in this phase, if  the yards should retain a chance for survival. Construction financ·  g 
for the ships could be secured to a large extent through loans from commercial banks whi h 
were secured by mortgages on the ships and in  part by construction financing guarant 
The extension of  the Mecklenburg-Vorpom'llem guaraat::e scheme to provide this type 
guarantees was authorised by the Commission end of' February 1996 (state aid case no. 
107/96}'  . 
Funds for  a continuation of the physical restructuring and  for the covering of operati  e 
losses could in  the. first  phase  only be  secured by the advanced  sale of land  no  lon  r 
needed. In the case of  MTW part of  the investments could be financed by the release o  a 
last tranche of  48.4 mio DM restructuring aid for MTW from a blocked account (state  "d 
no. N 207/96t. 
7.  To secure progress of  works on the yards BvS provided a number of short-term loans si  e 
May 1996. The German government took the line that these loans could not be consider 
as new state aid. First they were meant to replace approved state aid for the restructuring of 
the yards which had not become effective on the Ill8rket because it was misused, and seco  d 
as  the  loans  had  been  given  on market  terms.  The  Commission  did  not  follow  th se 
arguments: In  its decision of 10 December 1996 to open the Art. 93(2) procedure' it ar  d 
that  the investigations  on the  misuse  of aid  evidenced  that the original  payments  w  re 
received by the yards and were clearly state ai<;l,  even if they were subsequently misus  d. 
Nor· could  it  be accepted that  the loans  were  given  on market  conditions when it  as 
evident that  no  commercial  bank would  have  provided  such  loans  whose  repayment  is 
unsecured. 
8.  The Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommem and BvS managed finally to separate the yards fr  m 
BW  after a politically and legally complicated proced1,1re in spring and summer 1996. Si  ce 
then, the two yards are owned by the Land
8 and BvS in expectation of a subsequent 
privatisation. A consulting company was commissioned by BvS to undertake a fundame  tal 
review  of the  current  restructuring  concepts.  In  essence,  the  consultants  came  to  he 
conclusion that in order to ser-ure viability of the yards major organisational changes  d 
implementationofvarious cost-cutting measures was needed. The employment guarant  es 
until 1996/97 under the original privatisation agreements were no longer tenable, but a 
drastic  reduction of persor.:tel  was  unavoidable.  In  view  of the  advanced  stage  of 
construction works, however, only minor modifications of the investment programme 
possible. 
9.  The notification ofthe state aid for the continuation of the restructuring was delayed du  to 
difficulties  to  reach  an  agreement  on  the  financing  between  the  new  owners.  A  rst 
notification  was  received  by  the  Commissio"n  on 3  September  1996.  It was  how  er 
5 OJ No. C 150/96 of  24 May 96 
6 OJ No.C 215/96 of  25 July 96. 
7 State aid cases nos. NN 102/103/96, OJ No .......  (publication in preparation) In total1oans amounting to 105 mio DM 
were committed for MTW and 195 mio DM to VWS 
8 In the case ofVWS, the city ofStralsund continues to hold 11% of  equity. However, the city is not involved in tl1e  1er 
financing of  the restructuring. 
3 incomplete, in particular as some key info~  ll()n~  the _planned operating aid a,nd 
the  foreseen  lll1llll80IJ1ents.  ~r a  new  prlvatisation were  missing.  Apa6  from  that  the 
Commission  felt  ·that  some  assumptions  determining  the·  elq)e(lted_  viability  of the 
restructuring  concepts  eould  be  Questioned.  With  letter  of 16  September  1996  the . 
Commission asked therefore for .filnQer in'formatiqn a.nd announced that it would have some 
aspects of  the restructuring firms reviewed byan~dent  consultant.  · ··•· '-
10. The consultant visited the two  yards end of October 1996.  In his· report he came to the 
conclusion that the investments und~  were in line with the investment plan approved 
by the Commission under the original restructt.uing.  The investment$ should, onc:O they· are 
completed,  allow  to  achieve the productivity levels envisaged  provided that the planned 
organisational ·changes  are  fully  implemented.  The  consultant  cautionel(  however,  that 
commercial viability especially of  Volkswer.ft will depend very much on whether the yards 
are successful in buildingmo1oophisticated ships than the container ships .on which they 
have to focus  during ·the restructuring period.  Success in this new product mix  required 
however Sufficient marketing and design capacity. This can either be provided' from outside 
in the case of  a take-over by an experienced shipbuilder.  Otherwi~~C  it has to be prOVided in-
hou~~C by  the  yards.  The  Commission  conununicated  the~~C · findings  to  the  German 
government and requested-that this, same as a IIUDiber of  other issues, was to be addressed 
in the reviled notification. .  · 
In  respoD~~C to. the questions and observations from the Commission the German gOv-ernment 
provided revised notifications in mid January 1997 upon which thC further text is based. 
" 
Ill.  The new restructuring plans 11nd the  ~nvisaged aid programme 
ll.BvS commissioned  speciali$ed  consultants  and  an  international  merchant  bank  with  the 
preparation of  a new privatisation of  the yards. In order to contact potential investors world 
·wide, detailed documents were prepared  Theil«' were sent 0ut to .a wide range of  potential 
investors,  which  are  oonsidered  qualified.  A  number  of  the~~~' .showed  interest_  and  '  .  -
preliminary  discussions  have  been started.  The  German  government  feels  that  there  are 
good prospects to find one ore several buyers 'Which are willing to ,take over the yards and 
to operate them successfully. In the worst else, however, a temporary stand-alone solution 
is also  considered as viable,  notwithstanding the sincere intention to reach a privatisation. 
For the time being the German government lees, however. no chance to indicate a definitive 
timetable for the conelusion of  the privatisations and their  outeotne~>, the more so,  as  this 
depends to a large degree on the decisions of  the Council and finally the Commission on the 
various state aid aspects.  · 
4 12.0bviously, the defiilitive production programme of  the two yards will depend largely on  he 
results of  a future privatisation as well. Especially if  the buyer is an established shipbuil  er, 
he  will  allocate  contracts  to  the  yards  in  consideration  of the  combined  produc  on 
capacities of his group. The orderbooks for 1997/8 With their strong dominance of sm  ler 
contiliner ships reflect the technical limitations .of the yards during the restructuring as  he 
dock ofMTW and the shiplift in the case ofVWS are still under construction:· To ace  ain 
extent, the orderbook particularly of  VWS, is a heritage from the BW period as a nu  er 
of contracts were concluded in ·1995  on fairly unfavourable terms.  Both yards take ac ive 
steps to diversifY  their production programme,  the more so as the container ship  m  et 
seems to be weakening. MTW obtained a contract on a medium size cruise vessel and 
ice-breaking tankers and is in negotiation about further orders of this type.  The efforts  r 
diversification are less advanced in VWS, but first results have been as well by contracts  r 
two  combi-freighters  and  a  dredger  and  several  projects  under  negotiation.  The  y  ds 
expect therefore for the coming years a better market position and a decreased depende  cy 
from the container ship market. Notwithstanding to this,  the two yards with their mod  rn 
facilities  expect  to  be  able  to  produce  container  vessels  at  market  prices  after  II 
completion of  the restructuring. 
13.The financial  scope and  the  principal  technical  elements  of the  investment  progr  es 
remain almost unchanged. While the consultants ofBvS reviewed the programmes in de  th 
in view ofpotential cost savings, they came to the conclusion that it was too late for m ·or 
modifications.  The vast majority of the contracts had already been placed and works h ve 
started on all major investments. Apart from that, it was found that commercial viabili  of 
the yards  could  not be  achieved  without  the  investments.  This  argument  is  particul  ly 
important for VWS which needed to be changed from a yard equipped for fishing vessel  to 
a modern multi-purpose yard for  larger  ships.  According to the revised  estimates,  t  tal 
investment costs will increase by about 7% in comparison to the plans in  1992/3. In b  th 
yards part of  the cost increase is caused by claims of contractors related to the collaps  of 
BVV(eg claims for interruptions of  works and for late payments). In the case ofMTW  he 
remainder  was  caused  by  difficult  subsoil  conditions,  while  in  the  case  of VWS  he 
investment  programme was  slightly  modified  to  increase  the flexibility  of the yard.  he 
following table gives an overview of  the old and new investment budget. 
5 Table 3:Investments of  MTW and VWS 
.  .·  -
.  .  .MTW  vws 
Total investments foreseen under the'  562.2  -637.0 
original restructul"in8 programme 
(1992/93)  .  . 
. 
cost increases and modifiCations  36.0  42.0 
.  Total investments foreseen under the ·  598.2  679.0 
revised restmcturing programme (199'1)  .  . 
w/o continaencies 
of  which 
, paid until  end 199S  .  233.5  ..  286.4  .  . 
' paid in 1996 (provisional)  148.1  158.7· 
to be paid in 1997  169.6  175.1 
to be paid 1998 
.  47.0  47:8 
. 
to be paid 1999/00  .·  0.0  19.8 
. 
. 
contingencies  . 20.0  .8.7 
' 
The above table shows that the investments are already very advanced and that the 
programmes will be virtually completed by end of  1998.  • 
. 
14. While the changes in the investment programmes are relatively minor, the financing ofthe 
costs changes fundamentally: First, the own contribution  which w~  expected from  BW 
has now to be met bythe state as new owner. Second, the shor:tfall due to the misuse of . 
some of  the investment aid has to be. met from the state as well. In an overview the total . 
financing situation is therefore as following: 
/ 
6 Table 4: Financing of  the investments ofMTW and VWS 
MTW  vws 
Total investments foreseen  618.2  •  87.7 
! (with contingencies) 
:_.,_.  ·-
total (cash) investment aid released under  288.8  80.0 
the oril!;inal programme until end 1995 
ofwhich misused  -55.3  -1 D7.2
9 
investment aid actually received and used  233.5  72.8 
under the original restructuring 
1  pr6grammes until end 1995 
financed from own sources (1995/6)  10.9  13.6 
residual funds of  original programme  48.4  -,-
released in April 1996 
I (state aid case no. N 207/96) 
new funding envisaged  325.4  ~ 01.4 
' 
of  which 
Loans from BvS/Land MV  129.4  147.0  . 
(on concessional conditionsi
0 
. 
___  _9r~t~d (lnv.-Zusch\isse)  176.0
11  245.7 
Contingencies (potential. aid)  i  20.0  8.7 
15.  The  revised  restructuring  plans  envisage  a  drastic  reduction  of labour  costs  to gun 
competitiveness.  To this end  an  agreement was  reached with the  staff on a substan  al 
reduction of  wages. In addition, staff will be reduced in steps until end of 1999 from 20  9 
to 1128 in VWS and from 1859 to 1184 in MTW. It is argued that this reduction is  caus~d 
by the strict limitation of  capacity and therefore production of  the yards. At the same ti  f!e 
the increased competitive pressure  forces the yards to limit staff to the absolute minimu!n. 
The new and additional lay-off of  personnel is very painful in the present situation oft e 
labour market.  It is therefor.e to be assisted by a social package of 50.2 mio..  DM in  t  e 
case ofVWS and 26.5 mio.  DM in the case ofMTW. Payments under this package 1  e 
strictly limited to severance payments (the amount varies according to social criteria) lll d 
costs  tor  temporary  employment  in  the  communal  sector  and  retraining  to  fi  d 
employment  ·  outside  of  shipbuilding.  For  this  purpose  so-called  "AB~­
Gesellschaften"(  employment firms) have been created, same as in comparable cases in t  e 
regiOn. 
16.  The  operating  aid  given  to  the  yards  under  the  original  restructuring  programme  h d 
basically three  p~>es: (a)  to cover  losses  under  contrac~s concluded  under the  c d 
regime  (before  1.7.1990),  (b)  to  cover  losses  on  contracts  to  be  handled  during  t  e 
restr o.1.:turing period (when productivity gains from the restructuring are not yet achiev  d 
and  production is  impeded by the reconstruction \vorks) and (c) to provide a reasonab e 
working capital base for the yards.  The first  reason is  no  longer relevant.  Hov.ever,  t  e 
second and the third are still relevant. 
'includes 70.4 mio DM investment aid which was paid as loan prior to release of  aid by Commission (comp. C7/96) 
10 The concessional elements consist of an interest free grace period of  about 2 years and soft repayment term! 
(7% interest + I% repayrneni as from the year 2000) 
11  includes "Abgrenzung MwSt" DM 3.8 Mio 
7 ~ 
The notification$ show t11at both yards face considerable additional production costs until 
end ofl998 as key components (~  tile dock arid the sbiplifts) ofthe  installations are 
not yet completed.  . 
In addition,  the two yards were stripped of all free liquidity and liquidable assets in the 
·  course of  the financial breakdowrt ofBVV and due to the misuse of  funds. Hence they lost 
all their working  ~pita! and aft there reserves which should.have been served to cover 
j>etiding losses under existilig contracts. 
On top  of that  they lost  also  some  advance  payments  from  clients  through the  cash 
concentration $Ystem.  As the yards have no working capital left. and no securities to offer, 
they have  no  access to bank  finlulclJlg UnleSs  an  external guarantee is proVided.  St~~.te 
guarantees  are. also  needed to secure· advance  payment  and  performance  bonds  as  no 
commercial bank is presently willing to provide such guara.DteesWithout a cash depo~  or 
a .counter  8uarantee ·from  the· owners,  According  to_ the  notification, it  .. is  planned· to 
address this' problem first  by  the  provision  of state  guaranteeS  not  only  for  the  usual 
constructiOn financing but also for a working capital credit line and advance payment and 
performance bonds. In case this proves to be· not sufficient the notification.fore8ees that an 
incr~  of  equity by an amount of  SO niio DM in MTW and 60 mio DM in Volkswerft 
will be provided. These amounts have theret"ore the character of  eontingencies. 
.  '  '  .  '  . 
Same as all other yards in Gerlilany MTW and VwS are to receive connict related aid in the 
fonn of  grants under the ''Wettbewerbshilfe"scheme.  ·  · 
In an overview the amounts of  operating aid, inclUding the social aid package described above, 
are given in the following tables:  ·  · 
8 Table 5: Total operating aid foreseen for MTW 
A. Operating aid linked to 
the 
A.1  to_ compensate excess 
cost 
a.id equivalent 
· Total operating aid 
For ease of  reference:  · 
tumover
13 
potential Increase of  working 
capital through increase of 
1996  1998  1999 
65.783  38.233  24.051 
2000  96/00 
_  _.._  .. :.._ 
o.o·  -2.790 
12 contract related aid, aid ·equivalent I 0% p.a. of  guaranteed amount, in accordance of  the "I  0% rule" applicable .in the 
shipbuilding sector 
13 Gross turnover+/-works in progress, minus "Wettbi:werbshilfe" 
9 Table 6: Total opernting aid forgeen for VW§ 
potential increase of  working 
capital through increase of 
aid 
1996 
(15.042 
1997  1998 
57.631  5.365  -0.09 
96/00 
0.0  128.029 
60.000 
. 429.171 
In the case ofMTW the total new operating aid linked to the restructuring
17 amounts to 167.5 
· mio. DM and is considerably less than the amount of  operating aid under the old programme 
which  got misused.  In the case  of vws  the  amount  of  new  operating  aid  linked  to the . 
· restructuring is,,;236.2  mio.  DM,  against  60.7 mio.  DM misused.  The tables  above  show 
further that  due to the new operating aid the ceiling is exceeded in the period 19961'98 while . 
the qment ceiling would be respected in 1999 and 2000 unless the .contingency amounts will 
be paid in one of  these years. 
17.  According  to  the  new  restructuring  concept,  BvS  and  the  Land  Mecklenburgc 
Vorpommern finance  as  new owners the completion of the restructuring.  Insofar  they 
adopt the role of Bremer Vulkan VerbUII!i  (BVV). ·In parallel  all  claims  of the yards 
14 The nature and th~  justification of  these claims is still under  ex.Bmination by BvS,  according to_the notification the 
·claims are related to social aid for 1995 and WU'eCOVerables from Schiffscommerz 
"  preliminary estimate 
16 for definitiim cp. f"!ltnote  I  0  "  · .. 
17 I.e. total aid (before contingency) rninusWettbewerbshilfe and construction financing guarantees. These two items are to 
be deducted as these fonns ofaid are available Cot all German yards up to the Bid intet!sity of  the ceilillg. 
10 against BVV which were filed under the bankruptcy procedure (846.1 mio DM see point 
above) are ceded to BvS, and BvS waives all  claims against the yards.  Such claims 
concerning: 
-·  an investment loan of 112.4 mio DM given by Treuhandanstalt. (now BvS) to 
which was not used for investments but was transferred to BVV  ·-~  c. 
- investment aid on an amount of 70.4 mio  DM and 0.4 mio.DM closure aid 
under the original aid budget of  Volkswerft but disbursed as a loan from BvS prior 
the release by the Commission and misused in the cash-concentration system 
- regional development  aid  provided under the "Gemeinschaftsaufgabe"  scheme  on 
amount of 8.15  mio DM (MTW) and 6.3  mio.  DM (VWS) which should have 
retransferred to BvS but were placed in the cash-concentration system ofBVV
18
. 
By this arrangement it is avoided that the financial situation of  the yards is influenced 
any repayments potentially made at the end of the bankruptcy procedure of BVV wh1r.h 
will now be made in favour ofBvS and not to the yards.At the same time it is avoided 
the budget is inflated by provisions for repayments of  the above claims whicl). would 
to be financed by the recipient BvS, what obviously would make little sense. 
18.  The German government gave the undertaking that 'no further  restructuring aid,  r ...  ,.,,.. 
aid, loss compensation or aid for privatization on top of  the amounts notified now will 
providt:d for the yards. If  one compares finally the amounts of the yards lost in the 
concentration  system  and  the  total  amounts  now  needed  for  the  completion  for 
restructuring the situation is as following:  · 
Table 7: Comparison of misused funds and new aid required (mio DM)· 
amounts lost in the cash 
of  which 
18 additional amow1ts of 5.65 mio DM (MTW) and 6.0 mio. DM (VWS) were used for investment fmancing in early 
these are contained in the investment budget 
19 Aid intensities and aid equivalents as calculated by the Commission (compare Tables 4/5/6) 
1 IV. The Commission Proposal 
19 .In the explanatory memorandum to the proposal of the Commission for the later Council 
Pirective 92/68/EEC which provided the special rules for the restructuring of  the shipylirds 
located  in  the former GDR, 
20  the  commission  set  out that ·a balance  had cto  be found  .  -
between the regional development and employment interests, fur which·the modernisation 
of  east  German  shipbuilding  is  desired  and  the.  possible  negative  influence  on  the . 
conpetition  situation of other  Community  yards  resulting  from  the  aid  given  for  the 
modernisation.  This general principle· applied  by  the· Commission  and the  Council in. all 
major restrUcturing cases, in particular when a derogation under the respective Directive on 
aid  to  shipbuilding  is  required,  has  to be  applied  concerning  the  new restructuring 
programmes for MTW and VWS as well  ..  An application of  Article92,2 (c) of  the Treaty is 
considered as not appropriate by the Commission. This legal proVision was not invoked for 
the original programme. It is not appropriate to apply this provision in i1ie new case as the 
need for continued aid does not result from the partition of Germany but ihe particular 
mishaps described above.  The Commission can accept that many of the argumentS. of the 
original derogation are still  valid.  Nevertheless,  a review is  called for in the light .of the 
developments in the past few years .. 
20.The structural problems in Mecklenbqrg-Vorp\)mmern persist. Alteast German Lander are 
now classified  as  regions  to be  considered under  Article  92,  3  (a)  as  areas  where the 
standard of living  is  abnormally low and where there is  seri0us unemployment. In·  fact, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem is the poorest Landin the east of  Germany.  As the number of 
jobs in  agriculture and  industrY .decreased further  since 1992, the unemployment rate of 
18.0 %  is far higher than on average in Germany and the Collllriunity,  and that, although 
the  region  faced  a  high level  of emigration in  the past few  years.  According to recent 
fOrecasts  economic growth will  be  very limited  in  the next  years.  This  general  picture 
applies also to Wismar .the location of  MTW and Stralsund the location of VWS.  In both 
regions the shipyards are the principal employers and large parts of  the local economy are 
linked to them.  A  closure of the shipyards  would be  for  both cities  a  disaster  as the 
perspectives to create new local employment are bleak in general, and even more so for the 
specialized staff of  the shipyards; 
21. The perspectives fur Community shipbuilding for the next few years look less positive than 
in  1991/92. The sector is plagued by persisting overcapacities as new capacities come up 
mainly in Korea and China, and the price level  for n"w ships remains depresged.  This has 
created severe .difficulties fur a number of  Community yards in the recent past  and in qdte · 
a few cases these difficulties continue.  · 
20 SEC (92)99! final, dated 25 May 1992. 
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22. On the other hand, it would appear at this stage that the new aid for the completion oft e 
restructuring ofMTW and VWS will have no new impacts on competition in comparison 
the originally approved programme. The capacity limitations of 100000 cgt for MTW 
85000 cgt remain unchanged. They are in force since 1 January 1996 and will be applicab e 
for the same period as stipulated under Article 7 of  the Seventh Directive (Le.  minimum 5 
years, maximum 10 years). The actual production in the years 1995 and 1·996 was  less th 
1  0"/o below this capacity limitation, as the yards tried to compensate their reduced technic 
production capacities during the restructuring by a  higher staff input than which will  e 
realised later. It seenis therefore reasonable to assume that the impact of the continuati  n 
and completion of  the restructurings on the market will be very limited. 
23.In this Context, it may be also considered that the German government armounced that t  e 
Bremer  Vulkan  Werft  in  Bremen-Vegesack  will  be  closed  totally  for  newbuilding  f 
merchant ships as from summer 1997. Before the start of  the financial crisis of  the grou  , 
this yard employed almost 2000 staff. It is equipped with two dry docks and tliree slipwa  . 
The first dry dock has a dimension of  337m by 57m for construction of  vessels of  of  up  o 
300 000 dwt.  The second dry dock is covered and has a dimension of 170m by 25m :6  r 
ships up to 25 000 dwt. Two of the three slipways are taken out of active use since 198  . 
The third one can' accommodate ships up to 250m length and  32m width.  According  o 
information from the yard, its total capacity amounts to 225 000 cgt. While this figure m y 
represent the maximum attainable capacity rather than the active capacity, it is clear that t  e 
closure of the Bremer Vulkan  Werft will  result  in  a  substantial  reduction of Germ 
shipbuilding capacity  ..  In addition, German shipbuilding capacity will be reduced further  y 
a partial closure of  Schichau Seebeckwerft in Bremerhaven. The court administrator and t  e 
Land Bremen have, however, not yet taken a definitive position on the future of  this yard  n 
bankrupcy. 
24.A major part of  the aid to be given for a completion of  the restructurings replaces aid whi  h 
was  originally  already  approved  but was  not  used for  the  intended  purpose  as  it  w  s 
misused.  In fact,  from the investigations on the spill-over and misuse of aid
21  it  beca  e 
evident that the misuse occurred beyond the control of  the yards but through actions oft e 
former management of  their former mother company  BVV. In addition, the yards lost o  n 
funds due to these imposed tranfers. BvS has filed claims for repayment of  the withdra 
funds (not only the aid  part) under the bankruptcy procedure of BVV.  The Comrnissi  n 
investigates the recovery of  the aid, seeking for the recovery of  the misused aid from BV  , 
and, if appropriate against companies formerly  linked to the group who actually benefit  d 
from a major part of the misused amounts. It would be difficult to reject consideration  f 
any further restructuring aid, given that the yards were not responsible for the misuse of  id 
and  that  they  and  their  staff faced  already  a  substantial  consequential  damage,  goi  g 
considerably beyond the scope of the misuse.  Notwithstanding to this,  the Comrnissi  n 
takes, however, the view that the aid foreseen for the completion of  the restructurings ne  s 
to be considered as new aid requiring a new authorisation. 
25.As set out in Chapter ill  of  the <;eventh Directive, the prime condition for restructuring  'd 
to shipyards is the existence of a restructuring plan which does not involve an increase in 
the  shipbuilding  capacity.  It is  shown above,  that the capacity of the yards will  rem  in 
unchanged.  However,  the  more  advanced  understanding  of the  capacity  concept  or 
shipyards  and  new  practices  in  the  industry,  such  as  extended  outsourcing  d 
subcontracting, leads to the conclusion that the capacity of  a shipyard depends not only  n 
21 state aid case no. C7/96. for reference see footnote no  I above 
13 the dimension oft.he key installations but also on the actual production programme and the 
organisation of  production. The Commission and the German government agreed therefore, 
that the ·respect of  the capacity limit of  the east German yards will be enforced by a strict 
coirtrol of  production. The Commission will seek technical assistance to check the results of 
the established moilitoring system. 
26.Iil contrast to the situation in 1992, very detailed restructuring -plans are. available now  as 
the works are half completed: The financial calculatioQS should therefore have a high degree 
of accui-acy.  Remaining  risks  as regards  the restructuring  costs  were  addressCd  by  the 
provision 9f contingencies which will  only be used if  necessary.  After completion of the 
investments, both yards will have modern and  fl~le  facilities which allow 'a high level of 
productivity. The principal risks concerning the viability of  the yards after restructuring are, 
however,  less  linked  to  the. investments  but. to the  development  of tlje  ~ket and, . · 
particularly in the case of  VWS, the successful implementation of  the reotganisation of the 
yard,  which is  ~~solutely necessary for  the achievement of competitive production cc:ists. 
Obviously the important market risks typical for shipbuilding  cannot be  eliniiilated.  Both 
yards have taken measures to reduce their dependency from container ships which is partly 
a heritage oftheBVV periOd. 
· Diversification and reorganisation measures are more advanced in MTW.  In this case the 
information provided shows convinvingly that the enormous loss of 577 mio. DM placed in 
the cash concentration system is the reason why further aid is needed. Apart from that the 
yard is reasonably well positioned cin the IIIalket  ·  · 
In the case of  VWS the situation is more complicated. It needs to be recalled that this yard 
had a difficult starting position as it was specialised on fishing vessels for the former Eastern 
Block. It was only privatised in 1993 and needs a complete reorientation. It was cleat from 
the  beginning  that  considerable  time  would  be  needed  for  this  process.  In fact,  the 
privatisation agreement envisaged that the first  phase of the restructuring to be financ;:ed 
mainly from  state  aid  would  run  until  end  1997,  while  the  second  phase  to  be  entirely 
financed  from  BVV would run until  2005.  From hindsight,  some  aspects of  this  phased 
restructutin~ can be questioned. It is also clear that not only money but also valuable time 
was lost  due to the disturbances caused by the collapse of  BVV.  In areas like marketing· 
VWS was much closer linked to BVV than MTW.  Important changes in management took 
place  only  some  months  ago.  As  set  out m  the  notification  and  in  the. reports  of the 
· management consultants the steps taken in management and for rigorous cost control have 
improved the yard's perspectives. Diversification has however also its risks, mainly iQ form 
of cost-overruns,  but also  as VWS  is  not yet fully  established  on the envisaged  markets. 
Notwithstanding  these · risks,  the  Commission  can  accept  the  revised  restructuring 
progranune ·as realistic and viable. The advanced status of  construction needs to be taken in 
consideration  as  well:  In view  of the  risks  the  Commission  considers,  however,  the 
continuation of the intensive monitoring, meanwhile established by BvS,  for both yards as 
indispensable. In addition, the Commission will take measures including visits of  the sites to 
monitor that the conditions·ofthe aid and the capacity limitation.are respected in agreement 
with the Member State. 
2  7. The Commission takes the view that the entire envisaged operating aid  should be assessed 
under Chapter II of  the Seventh Directive, even if  the social aid 'part is normally assessed 
under Article 7, and it could be argued that some of  the aid foreseen to cover excess cost of 
production during the restructuring is from a technical point of  view directly linked to the 
investments  and  should then;fore considered  as  restructuring aid  under  Chapter Ill.  The 
reasons  for  that are,  that for an  application of Article  7 (Closure  Aid)  a Partial or total-
closure of  the same yards is necessary. This condition is not met here.  The excess costs of 
14 production during the restructuring are rather consequential costs than costs directly Iinke 
to the investment as required in Article 6(3). 
The total envisaged operating aid needed for the completion of  the restructurings exceeds i 
the period 1996/98 the current ceiling of 9"/o  of contract value before aid (Article 4)22  a 
of  turnover (Article 5) as set under the Seventh Directive. Therefore, a derogation from th 
provisions of chapter II of the Directive is  necessary for this period.  For reasons of leg 
clarity, the Commission proposes further  to  stipulate the maximum amounts of aid to b 
permissable for the completion of  each restructuring in the text of  the derogation and not t 
work with a ceiling expressed as a percentl!-ge of  future turnover. While a certain flaxibili 
for  reallocation  of amounts  under  the  individual  items  is  necessary  due  to· changes  i 
ci>ntracts,  no  reallocation of the social aid or investment aid for other  purposes shall b 
possible.In its evaluation of  the notifications the Commission will assess the justifcation an 
necessicy•ofthe actual amounts M operating aid .to be disbursed, and in particular the use o 
the contingencies.  · 
28. The investment aid foreseen for the completion of  the restructurings will be eviluated unde 
Article 6 of  the Seventh Directive. All discussed above, this provision requires that the aid i 
linked to a restructuring plan which does not involve ariy increase in the capacity of th 
yards. In addition Article 6(3) requires that the aid intensity is justified by the extent of  th 
restructuring involved and that the aid  is limited to supporting expenditure directly relate 
to the investment. At this stage it can be said that the investment aid and the loans foresee 
cover the direct costs for the physical modernisation of  the yards. The investment plans ar 
fully  specified  and  the  vast  majority  of  the  contracts  for  the  works  are  unde 
implementation. It appears that uncertainties about the final costs are therefore very limite 
All  part  of its  evaluation,  the  Commission  will  require  evidence  about  the  na.ure  an 
amounts of  the expenditure as a condition for release of  the investment aid. 
The  aid  intensity which  was  already  exceptionally  high  under the  original  restructurin 
· concepts increases further,  due to the fact that the originally envisaged contribution of  th 
private investor has now to be taken over by the state. All the yards have hardly any equit 
bit, and  as  the financial  returns  of the investments  are limited  and  volatile due  to hi 
sectoral risks, a financing of  the investments on a loan basis is only partly possible. For thi 
loan part the yards will pay interest from the year 2000. 
In view of the particular history of the  projects,  the Commission is  at this  stage of th 
opinion that  it  could  can  approve  the investment  aid  under  Article  6  of the  Sevent 
Directive  once the derogation has  been  approved by  the Council for  the  operating ai 
foreseen. 
29. The Commission t&kes  note of the waiver  of all  cl.Ums  from  ell!'lier  loans to MTW an 
VWS  and  out  oi misused  funds  under  the  "Gemeinschaftsaufgabe"  scheme,  and  of th 
ceding of all  claims on deposits of the yards in tile cash-concentration system of BVV t 
BvS. 
14.3.97 
22 The ceiling of  4.5% for smaller vessels and for conversions can be disregarded here, as the yards will be hardly involve 
in such contracts. 
1 ANNEX2 
Derogation for Greece to grant aid towards the restructuring and 
privatization of  the Hellenic shipyard 
I.  Background 
· Article 5 of  the Cooocil Directive 90/684/EEC provides for operating aid to be granted 
for shipbuilding yards up to the eeilUlg for contract-related production aid which is 
annually set by the Commission. This Ceiling has remained oochanged at 4.5% and 90AI 
of  the contract value respectively for ship conversion and newbuilding up to 10 MECU 
and for newbuildings equal  or above 10 ~CU.  ·  · 
Article 10 of  the Directive excluded Greece from this ceiling and allowed operating aid 
to be paid by Greece to public yards, if  linked to theirprivatisation until3U2.199l. 
ll.  The Privatisation of  Public shipyards in Greece-Article 10 of  the 
Directive 90/684/EEC.  .  . 
On the basis of  the mldertakings given by the Greek GOvernment that its public yards 
would be·privatised by 31 March 1993, the Commission accepted, on 23  December 
1992
1
,  that the write-offofthe debts of the four yards concerned by Article 10 of the 
Directive - jn the amounts notified to it -was c<lmpatible with the pr<>Vlsions of  Article 
10.  .  . 
The Elefsis Shipyard was sold in July 199r and the Nafsi Shipyard in 19933.  Failing 
the Greek Government to meet its commitments on time and after considerable delays, 
the Commission refused to prolong the deadline and initiated, on 16 FebruarY 1994
4
, 
proceediD.gs pursuant to art 93(2) EC in respect of the aid grimted by Greece to the. 
remaining two yards, because Hellenic and Neorion were, at that time, still ooder State 
owriership:  ·  · 
In summer 1994 the Greek Government succeeded to sell the Neorion Shipyard and 
informed the Commission with a letter dated 19 October i994. The Commission tried 
to .show flexibility with respect of  the repeated efforts of  the Greek Govermnent to find 
a  solution with the privatisation of the Hellenic but at the same  time continued to 
contemplate all legal possibilities to ensure the enforcement of  the Directive. For this 
reason,  on 26  July  1995,  the  Commission decided
5
,  to  close  the  procedure  un'der 
Article 93(2)  EC,  with a  positive  · decision for the aid to  Neorion and a  negative 
· decision conceining the aid to the Hellenic.  · 
However, at the request of the Greek Government claiming that the sale of  the yard 
was imminent, the Conooission decided to suspend the notification of  that decision. In · 
1 .OJ No C 88, 30.3.93. 
2 sale already acknowledged in the Commission decision of23.12.1992. 
' as informed by the Greek Government by letter dated 2/6/93. 
4 OJ No C 138, 20.5.94  . 
. 
5 PV(95) 1258, 26.7.1995, SEC{95) 1322/2, 24.7.95. its September meetings the Commission put off twice the execution of the July 1995 
decision. 
In September 1995, the Greek Government notified to the Commission the sale of  49% 
of the Hellenic Shipyard's shares to a co-operative of  the yard's workers. By doing so 
Greece made use  of paragraph 3 of Article  10  of the Directive  which '-allows  it to 
maintain a 51% majority holding in one of the yards if  justified by defence interests. 
· The process of privatisation was completed on 31  January  1996,  when the court of 
App~al in Athens  ratifi~d an agreement concluded between the creditors of the yards 
and set the amounts and conditions for the write-off of  the yard's debts. 
Following the sale of the yard, a business plan providing for the restructuring of the 
yard and its modernisation has been put into place. The number of  employees is going 
to be reduced from 2966 to  2000 and, after a planned investment for its modernisation, 
the yard is expected to return to profitability in 1998.  As part of the privatisation and 
restructuring process, in September 1996, following an open bid, the management of 
the yard was awarded to a private independent company.  This  private company has 
been rnnning the yard since then, with its main task to implement the business plan. 
The  conditions for the Commission to  approve  the  aid for  debts'  write-off for  the 
Hellenic yard seemed to be met. However, the amount of debts to be written-off has, 
as  informed by the Greek Government,  increased due  to  interests  produced by the 
existing debts on the 31.12.91 (GDR 44 billion) and accumulated until 31.01.96. The 
current debts  of the yard amount to  GDR  112.6 billion.  Out of this  amount,  GDR  · 
· 11.765 billion concern current business of the yard and will remain in its  accounts. 
GDR 46.355 billion correspond to credits for the building of  military vessels, activity 
which is outside the scope of the EC Treaty. This leaves GDR 54.525 billion, that the 
Greek  Government cannot write-off without the prior Commission's  approval.  This 
amount exceeds by GDR 10.525 billion the aid approved by the Commission in 1992. 
The new accrued debts (GDR 10.525  billion) are part of the liabilities  of the yard. 
Although related to the initial approved amount, the Commission considers that aid to 
cover interests on an approved aid, but which was not paid, constitute new aid as long 
as  the potential aid beneficiary has not been released from his liabilities for the initial 
debts.  The  Commission  considers  that  the  payment  of the  new  amount  would 
correspond  to  operating  aid.  The· Directive  does  not  provide  for  a  legal  basis  to 
approve such type of  aid and Article 10 provided for such possibility only until the end 
of 1991.  On the other hand the new aid cannot be approved,  under Article  5 of the 
·  Directive, because the aid amount exceeds the applicable ceiling. 
The Greek Government maintains that the aid is essential for the survival of the yar 
and to sustain the effort made to complete the restructuring of the Greek shipbuildin 
sector. They stress the importance of securing the operation of reliable ship repairin 
units  in the eastern Mediterranean basin which constitutes  a  substantial  market no 
covered sufficiently in this sector. 
The business plan prepared to allow th.e  company to reach its viability, is already i 
. place but its  success depends upon the  effective  and  on time  implementation of al 
measures. It is based on the assumption that the debts of  the yard will be written off 
(1 . approved by the decjsjon ofthe.Greek Court of Appeal An Un.portant investment plan 
is foreseen~ be shortly Un.plemented in order to modernise the yard. 
It must also be noted that the  ~certainty regaiding the clearance of the yard's debts 
. makes the banking institutionS reluctant to grant any further credit to  th~ yard putting 
thus in risk the whole restructi.Jring process. 
· Ill.  Assessment by the Commission 
The shipbuilding industry is of  stnrtegic Un.portance for Greece due to the high number 
of workers  involved (alntost 9 000)  and  the  geography  of the  country where  most 
communications between the many ,ISlands depend on maritime transport. 
The Commission ackhowledges the Un.portant effort Greece has made by trying to find 
a solution for· the pri'vatisation of all its yards within the frameworlc of the Directive. 
For this reason, the Commission has accepted the delay in·the·disposal of  the yards by 
sale but considers that the Directive does not provide a legal basis for it to approve aid . 
above  the  amounts  approved  in  1992  which  correspond  to  the  debts. existing  on 
31.12.1991. 
Considering, however, that the conditions for the yard to become viable have been met 
and in view of the social arid strategic Un.portance of that yard for the region and the 
whole country, the Commission takes the view that it is reasonable to provide a basis 
for declaring compatible aid for debts' write-off to cover the debts existing when the 
privatisation took place and in the amounts as ratified by the .Greek Court. 
3 Annex 3 
Derogation for Spain to grant aid towards the restructuring of  the publicly-
owned yards 
1.  Background 
1.1  During the closing stages of  the negotiation of  the OECD agreement respecting norm 
competitive conditions in the commercial  shipbuilding and shiprepair industry,  Sp  · 
outlined plans for additional restructuring of  its shipbuilding industry, entailing furthe 
substantial  workforce  reductions  and  a  capacity  reduction  of 30,000  cgrt  (fro 
· 400,000 cgrt to 370,000 cgrt). 
1.2  Accompanying note 1 to Annex II of' the agreement\ which has not yet entered int 
force,  provides  for  a  derogation  for  certain Member  States,  including  Spain.  Th 
derogation provides that in  Spain's case restructuring aids up to  180 billion  peseta 
may be paid up until 31 December 1998, made up as follows: 
(a)  assis~ance for social measures; 
(b)  assistance for restructuring costs incurred before the date of the agreement 
cOmmitted by the Spanish Government,  and approved by the Commission before tha 
date, but have not been paid due to budgetary problems; 
(c)  other assistance committed and  paid on the basis of costs incurred before 
January 1996 or inve~tment assistance paid after 1 January 1996 (up to a maximum 0  . 
10 billion pesetas).  · 
1.3  In November 1995 t!·:e  Spanish authorities notified the Commission of its plans unde 
the derogation to grant aids in support of  the restructuring of  the publicly-owned yard 
within the Divisi6n d'! Construcci6n Naval (DCN), up until 31  July  1995  part of th 
Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI), but now part of  the State owned holding Agenci 
Industrial del Estado (AIE). 
1.4  The aid notified was made up as follows: 
Outstanding previously approved loss 
compensation aid, but not paid due to 
budgetary constraints, as at 31 December 1994 
(capital + interest) 
Social aids 
Investment 
billion pesetas 
89.104 
80 
10 
1.5  In December 1995 the Commission decided
2
: 
•  I 
2 
to approve the 89.104 billion pesetas loss compensation aid  as being in accordan 
with  Article  SA of the  shipbuilding  aid  directive  (90/684/EEC,  as  amended  b 
Directive 94miECi; 
OJ C375 of 30 December 1994, p3 
OJ C 75 of 15 March 1996, p. 2 1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2. 
2.1 
3 
4 
5 
.to open the Article 93.2 procedure in respect of  proposed future tax credits amoiiiltiJJ8 
to approximately 48 billion pesetas in the period 1995-1998, which could constitute an 
additional aid; and  ·  · 
to continue its preliminary eXamination of  the remaining aspects of-the- case (the 80 
billion  pesetas  social  aid  and  10  billion  pesetas  investment  aid,  plus  additional 
payments totalling a further 62 billion pesetas apparently already made in the period 
1988 to  1994 to cover interest charges on unpaid l9ss compensation aid,  contract-
. related produCtion aid and restructuring aid). 
On 8 January  1997 the Commission decided to extend the Article 93.2 procedure
4  in 
order formally to investigate the remaining aspects above; plus extraordinary payments 
of  7.355 billion pesetaS in 1991  and  1993, possible aids, since the plan was notified to 
enable the yards to continue to operate despite mounting losses, and the compatibility 
of  the Astano yard's activities with the condition attached to a 1991  aid authorisation' 
that the yard should be .closed· to shipbuilding. 
Against  this  background,  durip.g  the  course of February  and  early  March,  Spanish 
Government has submitted supplementary information including a revised restructuring 
plan  together  with  further  and  updated  details  of the  public  financial  assistance 
measures· involved. 
Since these measures. include a!d elements that are L'lccmpatible with the shipbuilding 
aid directive, a derogation from the directive  i~ necessary before these measures cOuld 
be approved by the Commission.  · 
This communication outlines the Commission's proposals as regards s~ch a derogation, 
including the conditions that would be attached thereto. 
The Spanish public yards 
According to information provided by the Spanish authorities at the time of  the request for 
· the OECD derogation, the public yards had a total  capacity of  240,000 cgrt and comprised 
three large yards (Puerto Real,  Sevilla and Sestao) with a epmbined capacity of 195,000 
cgrt and three medium sized yards (Jufuuia and.Barreras,  plus Astander) with a combined 
capacity of  45,000 cgrt. The balance of  Spain's 400,000 cgrt total shipbuilding capacity was 
in the priVate sector yards (Z I yards), .with a combined capacity of  160,000 cgrt. 
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2 2.2  All at 31 December 1994 the public yards and their activities were as follows: 
AESA Puerto Real 
AESAC8diz 
AESA Sevilla 
AESASestao 
Astander 
Juliana 
Astano 
Barreras 
Newbuilding 
Repair and conversions 
Newbuilding 
Newbuilding 
Repair and conversions 
· Newbuilding 
Offshore and repair 
Newbuilding 
Astano, which had a capacity of  135,000 cgrt, is supposed to be closed to newbuilding until 
Match J  997 as a condition of  the 1991 ·loss compensation aid authorisation  . 
.  2.3  Since just prior to Spain's accession to the Community there has been a  number of 
efforts to restructure the  Sp~sh  shipbuilding industry.  Since  1984 there has been a 
reduction  in  capacity  from  1  million  tons  to  cgrt  to  400,000  cgrt  as  referred  to 
paragraph 2.1  above. During the same period there was a reduction in the workforce 
from 40,000 to 14,750 (as at 31 December 1993). 
2. 4  To  facilitate  this  restructuring  process,  under  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  shipbuilding  aid 
directives up until 1 January 1992 Spain was exempted from the general operating aid rules 
laid down under the directive, provided that the restructuring effurt continued and the aid 
level was progressively reduced.  In addition to these aids,  the Commission authorised in 
1991 (case C 26/89) loss compensation aid to the public yards covering the years 1987 to 
1992 amounting to 126.779 billion pesetas. 
2. 5  Despite the various measures taken, the publicly-owned yards continued to experience 
serious financial problems due to a number of factors such as the prevailing difficult 
market situation (characterised by a high level of  under  -activity at the yards) as well as 
delays in the receipt of  aid payments due to budgetary constraints. 
The public yards have therefore continued to make substantial losses, as shown in the 
following table 
Turnover 
Net loss after tax 
1990 
91,478 
9,179 
1991 
98,283 
6,654 
1992 
106,137 
15,843 
1993 
95,5"93 
32,525 
1994 
85,983 
27,221 
·  2. 6  During this  period  the  after  tax losses  were  approximately  28% lower than  losses 
before tax since IN1  was able to use DCN'  s losses to offset profits elsewhere in  the 
group,  with DCN  benefiting  from  the  resulting  tax  credits.  (The  turnover  figures 
include aids received in the form of  contract-related operating aid and restructuring aid, 
but not loss compensation aid). 
2.7.  Operating losses in 1995 and 1996 were of  the order of40 billion pesetas and 37 billion 
pesetas respectively. 
3 2.8  Against this background, during the ~urse  of 1995 .a further restructuring plan for the 
public  yards  was  drawn  up.  Parts  of this  plan,  p&;rticularly  as  regards  workforce 
reductions, have alre&dy been implemented as from  1 January 1996. Other elements of 
the original plan have been reinforced through additional measures,  .  . 
~ ... :  .  __ 
2.9  The objective of  the restructuring plan is a return to break even results by 1998, both at 
.the level of.individual yards an<l at the level ofDCN aS a whole:  The key elements of 
the phin can be summarized as foDo~: 
restructuring of  the corporate structure so that each yard is treated as a separate 
entity  · 
a reduction in costs of  material supplies of  8% 
.. 
a reduction in the workforce from 10,017 at the end of 1994 (compared with 
over 25,000 in 1984) to 6100 at the end of 1998 (of  which only 3789 will be 
engaged in newbuildings)  ·  · 
a wage freeze in 1997 and 1998 
greater flexibility in working practices and increased employee mobility between 
yards 
based on the current orderbook and further contracts signed and under 
negotiation, to make optimum use of available capacity 
investments in improved technology 
a 35% increase in newbuilding productivity (currently around 36 cgt per man  ' 
year, compared with16 cgt per man year in 1988} 
. a reduction in financial charges to 4% of  turnover 
3.  . Proposed Financial Assistance 
3  .I  It is proposed that these further restructuring measures would be underpinned by public 
financial assistance totalling 179.104 billion pesetas, made up as follows: 
(i)  Social aids 
(ii)  Investment aids 
(iii)  Loss compensation from the past 
billion pesetas 
80 
10 
89.104 
4 Social Aids 
3.2  The social aids are broken down as tbllows: 
Costs of  workforce reductioll6 prior 
to 31 December 1995 
Costs ofmbsequent workforce reductions 
Contingencies 
billion pesetas 
5.229 
65.777 
8.994 
3.3  A  large number of the wQrkforce  reductions  have  already  been  made,  the current 
· workforCe being around 7000. As at 31 December 1996, 66.816 billion pesetas of  total 
aid had already been paid, the balance of 13.184 billion pesetas forecast to be paid in 
1997. 
3.4  The breakdown by yard of  the workforce reductions will be as follows: 
Yard  Workfor~  WorkfQrce  Reduction 
end 1994  end 1998 
Puerto Real  2031  1390  641 
Sestao  2458  1230  1228 
Sevilla  679  364  315 
Juliana  720  450  270 
Barreras  454  355  99 
Astano  1971  1180  791 
cadiz  615  390.  225 
Astander  433  292  141 
Corporate services etc.  656  449  207 
Total  10017  6100  3917 
Investment Aids 
3. 5  The investment aids totalling 10 billion pesetas are due to be paid by the end of 1997 
and cover a range of  investments in a1 yards covering inter alia, integrated engineering 
systems,  improved production processes  and  product flows  (including  CAD/CAM), 
establishment  of research and  development  centre environmental. measures etc.  The 
breakdown is as follows: 
Technical info1T1ation 
Plant modifications linked to improved product flows 
Improvement of  the workshop installations and flows 
Adaptations for new products 
Improvements of  slipways and docks 
Implementation of  new technologies 
Soldering equipment 
Improvements in environmental impact 
Improvements of  auxiliary services 
Improvement of  plant's services 
Adaptation of  stores 
million pesetas 
476 
2511 
1327 
900 
1034 
660 
120 
1080 
116 
516 
77 
5 
l 
•  I 
l 
I Maintenance and replacement  277 
Safety improvements·  237 
Quality control  26 
Improvements in information systems  36 
Improvements in workshops and machines for repairs  ·  ·170 
Improvements in engine workshop  227 
Engine tooling  85 
Various  125 
TOTAL  10000 
6 3.6  The. breakdown by yard of  these investments will be as follows: 
Yard 
Puerto Real 
Sestao 
Sevilla 
. Juliana 
Barreras 
Astano 
cadiz 
Astander 
Corporate services etc. 
TOTAL 
Loss compensation 
bnPTAs 
1.75 
3.3 
0.35 
0.35 
0.3 
1.85 
0.35 
0.25 
u. 
10.0 
3.7  The  loss  compensation  aid  of 89.104  billion  pesetas  is  made  up  of 64.196  billion 
pesetas covering the unpaid balance as at  31  December  1994 of the  126.779 billion 
pesetas loss compensation aid approved in 1991 for the years 1987 to 1992 but delayed 
due to budgetary constraints, plus 24.908 billion pesetas covering the interest accrued 
due  to the  delays  in  payment.  This  part  of the  aid  package  was  approved  by  the 
Commission  in  December  1995.  The  breakdoWn  by  yard  for  these  outstanding 
payments was due to be as follows: 
Billion pesetas 
AESA  Barreras  Astano  Juliana  Astander  .  Total 
1995  24.706  0.381  5.924  2.045  0.59  33.646 
1996  30.194  0.104  1.579  1.580  0.468  33.925 
1997  12.244  0.210  3.025.  0.719  0.461  16.659 
1998  3.476  0  1.180  0.153  0.075  4.884 
Total  70.610  0.695  "11.708  4.497  1.594  89.104 
3.8  According to the  Spanish  authorities,  as at  31  December  1996  only  39.376 billion 
pesetas had been paid.  47.047 billion pesetas is  now scheduled for payment this year, 
with the remaining balance (2.681 billion pesetas) to be paid in 1998. 
Other measures 
3.9  In  addition  to  the  above  measures,  the  Spanish  authorities  have  informed  the 
Commission that in the light offorecast losses in 1997 higher than those assumed unde 
the  plan,  an  additional  capital  injection  of  15  billion  pesetas  will  be  necessary. 
Furthermore, the yards will also receive benefits from tax credits now estimated at 5 
billion pesetas in the period up to  end 1998 (up from the 48 bn pesetas figure subject t 
the ArtiCle 93.2 procedure). 
I 
I. (AS noted, above in paragraph 2.6,  in the. past DCN's after tax losses. were reduced 
thi-ough  the  State shareholder  INI, in  accordance  with normal  Spanish  practice  in 
relation to holdings, offsetting before tax losses against profits elsewhere in the group. 
DCN obtained a s1tare of  the resulting tax credits. The DCN restructuring plan assumes 
such credits will ootrtinue  to  be available m  the  future  despite  the fact  that  since  I 
August 1995 DCN has fonned part of  the loss making state holding company AlE). 
3  .I  0  In addition to these measures it appears that during the period 1988 to 1994 the yards 
received additional payments totalling 62.068 billion pesetas to cover interest on loans 
taken  on  to  cover  delays  in  the  payment  of previously ·approved  aids.  This  sum 
comprises 24.325  billion pesetas relating to unpaid  contract-related and restructuring 
aid; and 37.703 billion pesetas to cover unpaid loss compensation aid.  The yards -also 
received extraordinary payments from INI totalling 7.355 billion pesetas in  1991  and 
1993to cover the costs of workforce reductions in those years [amounting t9 3.980 
billion pesetas (300 workers)]; and  the costs of indemnities arising  from  the Amoco 
Cadiz acident in 1978, amounting to 3.375 billion pesetas.  · · 
•' 
4. ·  Capacity reductions 
4.1  Under the restructuring plan it is proJ)osed that a 30,000 cgrt capacity reduction in the 
public yards would be achieved with immediate effect through:  . 
•  the cessation of newbuilding  at Astander (last vessel completed  1990), with the yard 
focussing exclusively on conversion and repair. 
•  the closure of  a dry dock (146.6 m x 21.8 m) at Sestao 
•  the non-utilisation of  a dry dock (148.7 m x 22.5m) at Sevilla 
•  the closure of  a slipway (60 m x 15m) at Sevilla 
•  the closure of  a slipway (67 m x 14m) at Barreras. 
4.2  This would result in total capacity in the  pt~blic yards  red~cing from 240,000 cgrt to 
210,000 cgrt; this being broken down by yard as follows: 
cgrt 
Current  Proposed  Reduction 
Puerto Real  80,000  75,000  5,000 
Sestao  85,000  75,000  10,000 
Sevilla  30,000  23,000  7,000 
Barreras  18,500  18,500  0 
JUliana  18,500  18,500  0 
Astander  8.000  _Q  8,000 
240,000  210,000*  30,000 
(*  this  overall  capacity  level  would  be  respected,  although  variations  at  individual 
yards could be possible within the qveralllevel). 
4.3  The Spanish authorities have also given ari undertaking that the Astano yard (capacity 
135,000  cgrt),  which  in  accordllnce with the  1991  aid  authorisation  referred  to  at 
paragrah 2.2 above could be,reopened for shipbuilding as from the end of  March 1997, 
will remain closed for such activities. 
8 4.4  In addition there would be a capacity reduction of 17,500 cgrt reduction in the private 
sector yards through closures and/or changes of  activity. 
4.5  The private sector contribution would be as follows: 
Capacity 
reduction (cgrt) 
Year  of  closure  New activities (if-arty) 
(  newbuilding) 
Atlantica  10,000  1990  Total  closure  (dismantling 
of  installations) 
Ardeag  2,000  1993  Total  closure  (dismantling 
of  installations) 
Luzuriaga  1995  Change  of  owner;  now 
mainly  · conversion/repair, 
plus building small vessels 
Mallo  rca  3,000  1995  Repair  .. 
5.  The Commission's position 
5.1  The  need ·for  a .further  restructuring  of the  publicly  owned  yards  m  Spain  was 
foreshadowed in the OECD agreement. 
5.2  Council Regulation 3094/95 is intended to give effect to the state aid provisions of the 
agreement.  However  in  the absence  of entry  into  force  ofthe OECD  agreement, 
Council Regulation  1904/96 states that the rules  of the Seventh directive on aid  to 
shipbuilding  (90/684/EEC,  as  most  recently  amended  by  directive  94/73/EC)  shall  . 
continue to apply until the agreement enters into force and until 31  December 1997 at 
the latest. 
5.3  It follows that in assessing this case the Commission, while being mindful of  the history 
of the provisions of  the OECD agreement, should take the rules of the directive as its 
point of  departure. In particular in its approach the Commission needs to establish 
whether and to what extent the public financial measures involved constitute state 
aids and if  so wh~her  these are compatible with the shipbuilding directive 
whether the nature and extent of  the capacity reductions are sufficient counterpart 
to the aid to minimise distortions to competition in general and to fulfill the 
requirements of  the directive (having regard also to the history of  the OECD 
derogation) in particular; and 
whether measilres envisaged in the plan will lead to a return to viability for the 
yards (to obviate the need for further" aids in future). 
Viabilitv 
5.4 
• 
According  to  the  Spanish  authorities,  if  all  the  measures  under  the  plan  ar 
implemented in full, the yards should achieve viability very quickly, by the end of 1998. 
In any event, if any individual yard does not return to viability by that date the yard(  s) 
concerned will  not be paid any  more aid except closure aid  and  contract-related ai 
Reduced from 5,000 cgrt 
I 
I 
l ------c-----~--- •---·----------- -e-·-·----·.._.._...1.-._J..__,__..-- ~-----· ·-~-
linked to future contracts ln accordance :with then prevailing ruleS for the shipbuilding 
sector. The Commission considers at this stage that this provides a sufficient test of 
viabilitY and  will  ensure  that  this  is  achieved  1zy  making  it  a condition  of the  aid 
approval.  this  approval  would  alSo. be ·contingent  on  close  monitoring  by  the 
Commission, if  necessary assisted by  independent experts, to ensure that the necessary 
level of  viability (ie break even) is achieved.  ··•  c. 
Capacitv reductions 
5.5  As regards capacity reductions, according to the Spanish 111.1thorities last year the public 
yards  were  operating at almost  100% capacity;  producing  some 230,000  to115.  The 
reductions proPosed can therefore be regarded as a genuine reduction in real capacity. 
5.6  The  Spanish  111.1thorities  have  also  undertaken that  production at the yards  will  not 
exceed  the  reduced  capacity  of 210,000  cgrt  The  Commission  wii(  assisted  by 
independent experts, undertake a close monitoring of  actual production levels to ensure 
that this level of production  is  not  exceeded.  In accordance  :with  the principles  of 
Article 7  .I of  the directive this would be for a period of I  0 yearS starting from the date 
of  the Commission's eventual approval of  the aid package.  · 
5. 7  The Commission also notes the undertaking of  the Spanish 111.1thorities that. the available 
135,000 cgrt capacity of Astano  will not  reopen to  shipbuilding.  This  will make  a 
further significant contribution since otherwise, notwjthstanding the capacity reductions 
proposed, there ~ul~  be. a large net increase in DCN's overall capacity. 
5.8  There  remains  however  a  question  over  Astano's  actiyities  in  respect  of floating 
production storage and offioading vessels (FPSO's), Which have included newbuildings 
and conversions. 
5. 9  The Spanish 111.1thorities consider that FPSOs are not vessels falling :within the definition 
of shipbuilding under the directive.  They maintain that such .vessels only have  power 
and steering capability to maintain position and to move  around the production area 
and  require  tugs to move greater distances.  However,  the  Commission at this stage 
continues to have doubts, In its view, FPSOs are metal-hulled seagoing. vessels falling 
within the directive unless  the  Completed  vessel  is  incapable  of directed  movement 
except by external assistance or methods such as windlass and an~hors. 
5.10  The Commission therefore at this stage intends to seek independent technical advice so 
that the issue ofFPSOs can be examined further within the context of  discussion this 
Autumn on future aid policy for the shipbuilding sector. 
Public· financial assistance 
5.11  As  noted  in  paragraph  3.1  above,  apart  from  the  89.104  billion  pesetas  loss· 
compensation  aid  already  approved  by  the· Commission  under  Article  SA of the 
directive,  the notified  aid  measures  comprised  social  aids  of 80  billion  pesetas  and 
investment aids of  10 billion pesetas. ·· 
5.12  So far as the social aids are concerned,  Article ·  7 of  the directive states .  inter alia that 
social  aids  to defray the normal  CoSts  resulting  from  the  partial  or total. closure of 
shipbuilding  or ship  repair yards  may  be  considered  compatible  with  the  common 
10 market pro\ided that the capacity reductions resulting from  such aid are of a genuine 
and irreversible nature.  This condition appears at this stage to be fulfilled in this case. 
Similarly the unnotified 3.  980 billion pesetas social aid paid in 1991 and  1993 could at 
this stage be regarded as falling within the overall restructuring of  the yards and thus be 
compatible with Article 7 of  the directive. 
5.13  AB  regard~ the investment  aids  of 10 billion  pesetas,  according  to  Article  6 of the 
directive,  investment aid  may not be granted for  shipbuilding unless  it  is  linked  to  a 
restructuring plan which does not involve any increase in the shipbuilding capacity of 
the yard or unless it is directly linked to a corresponding irreversible reduction in the 
capacity of  other yards in the same Member State over the same period.  Such aid may 
not be granted to ship repair yards unless linked to a restructuring plan which results in 
a reduction in the overall ship repair C!ipacity in the Member State concerned. 
5.14 ·  Since no increase is. proposed in shipbuilding capacity in the yards concerned and there 
is a decrease in shiprepair capacity (based on workforce reductions), the 'conditions of 
Article 6 appear at this stage to be respected. 
5.15  The  Commission  therefore  concludes  that  it  is  likely  that  all  the  outstanding  aids 
notified pursuant to the OECD derogation can be approved as being compatible with 
the directive, as can the social aids from the past. 
~. 16  There remains however the various other measures linked to the restructuring. 
5.17  AB regards the additional payments totalling 62.028 billion pesetas to cover interest on 
unpaid  aids  during the period  1988-94, according to  the  information  available to the 
Commission this sum comprises 24.325 billion pesetas to cover interest due on unpaid 
previously approved contract-related production aid and restructuring aid;  and 3  7. 703 
billion pesetas to cover interest on unpaid previously approved loss compensation aid. 
5.18  The Spanish authorities maintain that the payments  ~onstitute a measure of a general 
nature applicable to any firm in such circumstances and that the State, through INI,  as 
then shareholder of DCN,  was l('gally obliged  to  make  such  payments.  However,  the 
Commission  continues  to  have  doubts  whether  there  was  snch  an  obligation.  The 
decision  to  make  the  payments  appears  to  have  been  a unilateral  and  discretionary 
action. 
5.19  Although  the Commission recognises  that the payments  probably  did  not  ccnfer  any 
economic benefit on the yards  since the extra money was  intended only to .:over the 
financial charges incurred by DCN in obtaining loans to cover the shortfall in aid due to 
delays  in  payment,  it  must  be  concluded  at  this  stage  that  the  interest  payments 
represenf a new aid.  This  is  consistent with the approach  followed  in  relation to  the 
89.104  billion  loss  compensation  aid  provided  for  in  the  OECD  derogation  ar.d 
approved under Article SA of  the directive, which similarly includes interest payments. 
5.20  The directive does not provide a legal basis for approving such aids, which represent an 
additional operating aid in excess of  the aid ceiling. 
11 
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•  . 5.21  So far as the tax credits of  58 billion pesetas are concerned, it appears that in the past, 
·after tax losses were reduced through INI, in accordance with normal Spanish practice 
in  relation  to  holdings,  offsetting before tax losses  against  profits  elsewhere  in  the  · 
group.  The  financial  projections  under  the  plan ·assume  that  such  tax  credits  will 
continue to be available up until the end of  1998.  -~ '-
5.22  The Spanish authorities have introduced a general law applicable to all cOmpanies in 
such a position allowing them to receive from the state equivalent amounts  to what 
they would have been entitled under a tax consolidation system.  It is  proposed that 
such  arrangements would  apply until  31  December  1999.  According  to the Spanish 
authorities such a general measure would not constitute a state aid .. However, in the 
absence  of .  any  evidence  as  to who  apart  from  the  yards  Would  be  the  potential 
beneficiaries,  the  Commission  considers  at  this  stage  that  the measure  is  a specific 
measure  in  favour  of DCN  which  constitutes  a  state  aid  incompatible  with  the 
shipbuilding directive.  · · 
5.23  The proposed capital  injection  of 15  billion  pesetas  in  1997  to cover greater than 
expected losses is also at this stage considered to be a state aid incompatible with the 
directive. 
5.24  Finally as regards the extraordinary payment by INI of 3.375 billion pesetas to cover 
liabilities arising from the Amoco Cildiz accident,  the Commission acknowledges that 
these date back to 1978, prior to Spain's accession to the Community, and it therefore 
considers at this stage that the payments should not be regarded. as state aid within the 
meaning of  the Treaty.  . 
5.25  It follows  from the above that of the various  aids  involved,  amounting to a total of 
318.112 billion pesetas, 183.084 billion pesetas have been or could be approved under 
the shipbuilding aid directive,  leaving a balance of 135.028 billion pesetas requiring a 
derogation, made up as follows: 
Interest payments 1988-94 
Tax credits 1995-1999 
1997 capital injection 
bn ptas 
62.028 
58.00 
15.00 
135.028 
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